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Here we review studies on the complexity and strength of unconscious information
processing. We focus on empirical evidence that relates awareness of information
to cognitive control processes (e.g., response inhibition, conflict resolution, and
task-switching), the life-time of information maintenance (e.g., working memory) and the
possibility to integrate multiple pieces of information across space and time. Overall,
the results that we review paint a picture of local and specific effects of unconscious
information on various (high-level) brain regions, including areas in the prefrontal cortex.
Although this neural activation does not elicit any conscious experience, it is functional and
capable of influencingmany perceptual, cognitive (control) and decision-related processes,
sometimes even for relatively long periods of time. However, recent evidence also points
out interesting dissociations between conscious and unconscious information processing
when it comes to the duration, flexibility and the strategic use of that information for
complex operations and decision-making. Based on the available evidence, we conclude
that the role of task-relevance of subliminal information and meta-cognitive factors in
unconscious cognition need more attention in future work.
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INTRODUCTION
Although at first controversial, it is now generally accepted that
several perceptual, emotional and cognitive processes can unfold
in the absence of awareness. Laboratory examples of this are
the processing of subliminal (unconscious) words and numbers
(Marcel, 1983; Merikle and Reingold, 1990; Greenwald et al.,
1996; Dehaene et al., 1998; Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000), pictures
of faces/houses (Sterzer et al., 2008; Kouider et al., 2009), tools
(Fang and He, 2005), and emotional material such as angry faces
or eye-gaze directions (Whalen et al., 1998, 2004). Going beyond
visual perception, subliminal information processing has been
demonstrated for auditory (Sadaghiani et al., 2009), somatosen-
sory (Eimer et al., 2002) and olfactory (Li et al., 2007) infor-
mation. In recent years the number of processes that operate
or are influenced unconsciously has increased steadily, and now
include reward- and motivation-related processes (Custers and
Aarts, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Capa et al., 2011) as well
as decision-making (Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Pessiglione et al.,
2008; Custers and Aarts, 2010). One might wonder whether there
are any processes that can exclusively be performed on conscious
information. In this paper we review studies that explored the
boundary conditions of unconscious information processing and
specifically highlight those studies that were aimed at testing the
role of consciousness in cognitive control, long-term informa-
tion maintenance and strategic decision-making. Here, wemainly
focus on cognitive aspects of unconscious information process-
ing, although neural data is also discussed (see van Gaal and
Lamme, in press for a review of the literature in the field from
a more neural perspective).
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Some authors have argued that there might be some (cognitive)
processes truly bound to consciousness, although this is strongly
debated (for reviews see Umilta, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Jack and Shallice, 2001; Mayr, 2004; Hommel, 2007; Kunde
et al., 2012). One of the major candidates for this is cogni-
tive control, a general term for cognitive functions that allow
us to rapidly and flexibly adapt our behavior when necessary.
Cognitive control functions include error detection and correc-
tion mechanisms, conflict resolution, response inhibition, and
task-switching. These functions are all strongly associated with
the prefrontal cortex, which many consider pivotal for generating
awareness (for reviews see Rees, 2007; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011).
Interestingly, some cognitive control processes can be acti-
vated by unconscious stimuli. To our knowledge, the first to
show that some control processes can be initiated fully automati-
cally and unconsciously were Eimer and Schlaghecken (Eimer and
Schlaghecken, 1998; Eimer, 1999). In an impressive set of stud-
ies, they showed that unconscious (masked) arrow primes initially
facilitated responses, but can also inhibit responses in certain cir-
cumstances. In their tasks, subjects generally have to respond to
a target-arrow (e.g., ) that can be preceded by a congruent
() or incongruent () masked prime-arrow.When the interval
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between the prime and target is short (e.g., 50ms), subjects
respond faster and make fewer errors to congruent than to incon-
gruent trials, as might be expected. However, crucially, when
the delay between prime and target was increased (>100ms),
there was no response facilitation but rather automatic inhibition
of these responses. This led to the counterintuitive observation
that response times (RTs) were faster and error rates lower to
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (note that part
of the effect might be explained by lower-level stimulus charac-
teristics, see Lleras and Enns, 2004; Jaskowski and Przekoracka-
Krawczyk, 2005; Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2006). More recently,
automatic inhibition paradigms have been combined with brain-
imaging tools and the results suggest that automatic inhibition
relies on activity in the caudate and thalamus (Aron et al.,
2003) as well as the supplementary motor areas (Sumner et al.,
2007).
Recent studies have demonstrated the possibility to initiate
more “voluntary” forms of response inhibition unconsciously, as
studied by using the Go/No-Go task and the stop-signal paradigm
(Hughes et al., 2009; van Gaal and Lamme, in press). In these
tasks, subjects are required to inhibit an already initiated (stop
task) or planned response (Go/No-Go task). To illustrate, in one
of these experiments, subjects were instructed to respond as fast
as possible to the direction of an arrow (the go stimulus), but
to withhold this response when the word “STOP” (the “stop
stimulus”) was presented briefly and quickly after the go-arrow
(Figure 1A). However, when another word (e.g., “BLUF,” the “go-
on stimulus”) was presented, subjects had to continue responding
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Task-set-up. (B) Electrophysiological processing across
time of a masked stop-signal (the word “STOP”) compared to a
control “go-on” condition (e.g., the word “BLUF”). Three neural events
can be distinguished: (1) an early event at occipital electrodes, (2) a
middle event at fronto-central electrodes (The N2 ERP
component), and (3) a late event at centro-parietal electrodes
(The P3 ERP component). Adapted with permission from van Gaal et al.
(2011).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 121 | 2
van Gaal et al. Consciousness, cognitive control and decision-making
to the direction of the go-arrow. Crucially, the visibility of the
stop/go-on stimulus was manipulated by presenting it in between
random letter masks. Therefore, on some trials these stimuli were
clearly visible, whereas on other trials they were not. Behaviorally,
subjects slowed down their responses to unconscious stop-signals
(compared to unconscious go-on signals), as if the STOP signal
was briefly processed but not enough to cause a full response
inhibition. When electrophysiological responses to unconscious
stop- and go-on signals were compared, a cascade of neural
events could be observed, starting early at occipital electrodes,
swiftly progressing to fronto-central (the N2 ERP component)
and centro-parietal electrode sites (the P3 ERP component), later
in time (Figure 1B). Interestingly, in the conscious condition the
magnitude of the N2 ERP component was correlated with the
efficiency of inhibitory control across subjects (the stop-signal
reaction time) and with the magnitude of slowdown to uncon-
scious stop-signals. Thus, the N2 ERP component likely reflects
the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of the conscious
awareness of the control-initiating stop-signal. The frontal ori-
gin of this effect has been confirmed by source reconstruction
of the EEG signals (van Gaal et al., 2008) as well as by fMRI
(van Gaal et al., 2010b), in similar tasks. In fMRI, RT slowing to
unconscious No-Go signals was associated with focal activations
in the pre-SMA and inferior frontal cortices, bordering anterior
insula (van Gaal et al., 2010b), whereas response inhibition to
visible No-Go signals was related to large scale activation in a
typically observed fronto-parietal “inhibition network” (Aron,
2007; Simmonds et al., 2008). The strength of activation in the
unconscious inhibition network was correlated with the extent of
slowdown to unconscious No-Go signals across subjects, suggest-
ing that this activation is functional in a sense that it is related to
behavioral effects of cognitive control.
Recent results suggest that several cognitive control functions
other than response inhibition can be triggered by unconscious or
unnoticed stimuli (for a recent review see van Gaal and Lamme,
in press), including task-set preparation (Mattler, 2003; Lau and
Passingham, 2007; van Opstal et al., 2010; de Pisapia et al.,
2011; Reuss et al., 2011; Zhou and Davis, 201
tion/resolution (Ursu et al., 2009; D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2012)
(but see Dehaene et al., 2003; Bruchmann et al., 2011), motiva-
tion (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Aarts et al., 2008; Custers and Aarts,
2010) and error detection (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Hester et al.,
2005; Klein et al., 2007; O’Connell et al., 2007; Belopolsky et al.,
2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Dhar et al., 2011)
(but see Woodman, 2010). To illustrate, Lau and Passingham
(2007) cued participants consciously to perform either a phono-
logical or semantic judgment on an upcoming word. This con-
scious instruction cue was always preceded by a conscious or
unconscious prime associated with the same or the alternative
task (congruent vs. incongruent trials) (see also Mattler, 2003 for
a behavioral version of this experiment). When participants were
unconsciously primed to perform the phonological task, there
was increased activity in a cortical network associated with this
task (premotor cortex) and decreased activity in the cortical net-
work associated with the semantic task (inferior frontal cortex
andmiddle temporal gyrus), and vice versa. These results demon-
strate that task-related neural networks, incorporating prefrontal
cortex, can be modulated unconsciously. Further, the authors
showed that unconscious primes triggered stronger activity in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared to conscious primes,
irrespective of the specific task being cued. Recently, Zhou and
Davis (201
effect was not caused by low-level perceptual priming and could
still be observed when the unconscious cue was not part of the
consciously instructed task-set.
Although it has repeatedly been observed that the strength of
unconscious information processing increases considerably with
practice and learning (Damian, 2001; van den Bussche et al.,
2009; van Gaal et al., 2009), it has been shown that strong
stimulus-response bindings are not a prerequisite for sublimi-
nal processing to occur (for a meta-analysis see van den Bussche
et al., 2009). However, primes that are also included as targets
(“repeated primes”) have a stronger impact and might affect
motor responses earlier (have a faster time-course) than primes
that are not included as targets (“novel primes”) (Finkbeiner and
Friedman, 2011). In fact, also for higher-level cognitive control
processes, such as response inhibition, stimulus-response map-
pings can be flexibly changed without abolishing unconscious
priming effects. In a task in which amasked stimulus (diamond or
square) could be associated with either a Go or No-Go response,
but the specific mapping of stimuli onto these actions varied
on a trial-by-trial basis (by virtue of a pre-cue), it was recently
demonstrated that the same unconscious stimulus could have a
substantially different effect on behavior and (prefrontal) brain
activity depending on the rapidly changing task-context in which
it was presented (Wokke et al., 2011).
In conclusion, several “high-level” (prefrontal) cognitive func-
tions, such as response inhibition and task-switching, have been
observed to be influenced and modulated by subliminal stim-
uli. These activations seem truly functional, because they are
associated with behavioral indices of cognitive control. In the
next section, we will discuss the influence of top-down factors
(e.g., attention, task-set) on the extent of subliminal informa-
tion processing and whether subliminal information can initiate
top-down cognitive task-sets itself.
CONSCIOUS AWARENESS AND TOP-DOWN COGNITIVE
CONTROL
Traditionally, it has been assumed that unconscious processes
were rather automatic, inflexible, and independent of top-down
cognitive control (see Hommel, 2007; Kiefer et al., 2012 for
reviews). However, accumulating evidence shows that uncon-
scious information processing is not fully automatic, but can
be modulated by several top-down cognitive and attentional
factors. Overall, the instructed task-set and subjects’ strategy
strongly affects the strength, direction and depth of subliminal
information processing (Kunde et al., 2003; Greenwald et al.,
2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Kiefer and Martens, 2010;
Al-Janabi and Finkbeiner, 2011; O’Connor and Neill, 2011). For
example, the top-down instructed task-set, e.g., either to read
aloud a visible target word or to categorize it as representing nat-
ural or artificial objects, can change the processing route taken
by an unconscious (masked) word preceding the target word
(Nakamura et al., 2007). Along similar lines, Kiefer and Martens
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(2010) recently showed that the N400 ERP component to unre-
lated prime-target pairs (e.g., masked word “chair” followed by
a visible target word “leaf”), compared to related prime-target
pairs (e.g., masked word “chair” followed by visible target word
“table”), was enhanced when a semantic task-set was induced
by a visible cue presented immediately before each trial and was
attenuated by a perceptual task-set (see also Martens et al., 2011).
Further, attended subliminal stimuli have a stronger impact on
behavior than unattended subliminal stimuli, and this is the
case for spatial attention (Kentridge et al., 1999, 2004, 2008;
Sumner et al., 2006; Bahrami et al., 2008a; Marzouki et al., 2008;
Finkbeiner and Palermo, 2009), temporal attention (Naccache
et al., 2002; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006; Fabre et al., 2007) and dur-
ing attentional load (Bahrami et al., 2008b; Martens and Kiefer,
2009).
Task-relevant (attended) stimuli are processed stronger than
task-irrelevant (unattended) stimuli, even when unconscious.
Ansorge and Neumann (2005) showed that task-relevant prime
features (e.g., shape) affected responses to the target only when
the shape dimension was response relevant, but not when this
feature was task-irrelevant, for example when the color of the
target determined the required response (see also Tapia et al.,
2010). We recently explored the role of task-relevance of sub-
liminal information using EEG in a task in which subjects had
to respond as fast as possible to a black Go annulus, unless it
was preceded by a briefly presented gray circle (the no-go stim-
ulus). Due to variations in the SOA between the No-Go circle
and Go annulus, on some trials the No-Go circle was perceived
consciously, whereas on others it was not. On the current trial,
unconscious No-Go circles activated prefrontal control networks
(van Gaal et al., 2008), and the extent to which correlated strongly
with the amount of RT slowing to these stimuli. Crucially, exactly
the same subliminal gray circle did not activate the PFC when it
was task-irrelevant, but presented in a highly similar task-context
(although it yielded similar early visual responses). This result
highlights that the processing route taken by an unconscious
stimulus strongly depends on task-relevance (and attention to
the stimulus), and that task-irrelevant subliminal stimuli prob-
ably decay rapidly while progressing up in the cortical hierarchy.
Recently, it has been observed that, under some conditions, cogni-
tive control processes can still be influenced by subliminal stimuli
presented outside the direct focus of spatial attention (Rahnev
et al., 2012).
The role of attention and other top-down factors for uncon-
scious information processing might depend on type of informa-
tion to be processed. Recent research suggests that attention might
be more crucial for “neutral” stimuli (e.g., numbers: Naccache
et al., 2002) than for emotional, arousing or “evolutionary rele-
vant” stimuli. To illustrate, Finkbeiner and Palermo (2009) have
found that masked pictures of face stimuli produced priming
regardless of whether they were spatially attended (however, this
was not the case for subliminal eye-gaze cues: Al-Janabi and
Finkbeiner, 2011). In contrast, other non-face stimuli (animals,
vegetables) only produced subliminal priming when attended
(see also Harry et al., 2012). However, although it seems that
the threshold for conscious access is lower for emotional stim-
uli (Gaillard et al., 2006) and that these produce stronger priming
(Brooks et al., 2012), also emotional information processing does
not seem to be fully automatic and is alsomodulated by top-down
“attentional sensitization,” at least to some extent (Kiefer et al.,
2012). In fact, even when emotional pictures (e.g., faces) are pre-
sented fully consciously their depth and extent of processing seem
to be facilitated by attentional factors (Pessoa et al., 2002, 2003).
Attention itself can also be attracted unconsciously (for review
see Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes, 2010), for example by threaten-
ing (Lin et al., 2009), emotional (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001;
Brooks et al., 2012), erotic (Jiang et al., 2006), or socially rele-
vant stimuli (Sato et al., 2007), but also by lower-level stimulus
attributes, such as gamma flicker (Bauer et al., 2009) and stimulus
orientation (Rajimerhr, 2004). Recently, it has been shown that
individual differences in attentional bias to masked fearful faces
are related to gray matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex
(Carlson et al., 2012), suggesting that these attentional effects are
truly top-down mediated.
The literature reviewed above illustrates that consciously
instructed task-sets and strategies as well as attentional factors
strongly influence the processing of subliminal stimuli in vari-
ous ways. At present, it is still an open and important question
whether top-down task-sets can also be triggered by subliminal
information. Several studies have reported so-called “top-down
context effects.” In these experiments, subjects generally perform
a masked priming task consisting of congruent and incongruent
prime-target pairs. The crucial manipulation in such experiments
is the ratio of congruent and incongruent trials within experi-
mental blocks. In blocks in which the prime direction does not
predict the direction of the upcoming target (50% congruent and
50% incongruent trials) subjects are generally faster to congru-
ent than to incongruent trials. However, several experiments have
consistently revealed that the impact of conflicting stimuli on
behavior is larger when incongruent prime-target pairs are infre-
quent (∼20%) compared to when these are frequent (∼80%),
at least when conflicting stimuli are presented consciously (for
review see Desender and van den Bussche, 2012). In fact, the
effect might even completely reverse in such a way that responses
to incongruent prime-target pairs are faster than to congruent
pairs (Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Daza et al., 2002), because
subjects are able to strategically use the prime information to pre-
dict the upcoming target category. Even for conscious trials this
might take some time (∼400ms), suggesting that these strategic
effects take some time to build up (Ortells et al., 2003). These
conscious strategic effects were recently only observed for spa-
tially attended stimuli, but not for unattended ones (Ortells et al.,
2011). At present it is still disputed whether such context effects
depend on the conscious awareness of the primes, because sev-
eral studies have reported an absence of congruency effects when
the conflicting stimuli were presented subliminally (Merikle and
Joordens, 1997; Daza et al., 2002; van den Bussche et al., 2008;
Heinemann et al., 2009). However, other studies have shown that
context effects also apply to unconscious prime stimuli (Jaskowski
et al., 2003; Bodner andMasson, 2004;Wolbers et al., 2006; Klapp,
2007; Bodner andMulji, 2010). Interestingly, these context effects
initiated by subliminal primes might be related to increased
connectivity between the pre-SMA and stimulus-related (LOC)
and motor-related (putamen) brain areas (Wolbers et al., 2006),
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suggesting that the pre-SMA plays a role in the strategic control
over the processing of subliminally presented conflicting stimuli.
Several authors have noted that it is important to examine
whether these context effects are truly unconscious, at all pro-
cessing levels, and which part of the effect might be explained
by meta-cognitive (conscious) processes. For example, subjects
might become aware of the increased error rate, experienced “dif-
ficulty” or “effort” on blocks with high numbers of conflicting
trials and thereby might strategically adapt their response strat-
egy or attentional focus (Jaskowski et al., 2003; Kinoshita et al.,
2008, 2011, for a more extensive discussion of this issue see
Desender and van den Bussche, 2012 and below). Therefore, it
is still an open question whether top-down context effects can
also be initiated by unconscious stimuli (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001).
Heinemann et al. (2009) studied the role of conflict aware-
ness in a slightly different way, namely by examining the role
of context on conflict frequency effects, also referred to as the
context-specific proportion congruent effect (see also Crump
et al., 2006). They performed a typical masked priming task in
which subjects had to categorize target numbers as being larger
or smaller than 5. A target was always preceded by a masked
prime number that could be congruent or incongruent to the
target. Crucially, just before the presentation of the prime-target
pair they presented a colored rectangle at the background that
determined the congruency context (the colored rectangle disap-
peared upon presentation of the response feedback). One color
was consistently associated with a low interference context (80%
congruent trials, 20% incongruent trials), whereas another color
was associated with a high interference context (20% congruent
trials, 80% incongruent trials). As predicted, for weakly masked
primes (visible) the congruency effect (RT incongruent—RT con-
gruent) was significantly smaller in the high interference context
than in the low interference context (32 vs. 54ms). Crucially, they
showed that these context-specific congruency effects were absent
for strongly masked (poorly visible) trials. The authors concluded
that context-specific congruency adaptation requires conscious
representation of the conflicting information. Interestingly, pre-
vious work suggests that, even when using visible stimuli only,
subjects do not have any explicit awareness of the congru-
ency manipulation in similar tasks (Crump and Milliken, 2009).
Therefore, it has been suggested that context-specific congruency
effects might not depend on explicit knowledge of the congruency
proportions, butmight require sufficiently strong (i.e., conscious)
representations of the prime, target and context (Kunde et al.,
2012).
In a recent study, van Opstal et al. (2011a) took a somewhat
different approach and demonstrated that context effects might
indeed be initiated by subliminal primes. In their task, subjects
had to indicate whether two target numbers (e.g., 3–3) were
the same or different. These target numbers were always pre-
ceded by a masked (subliminal) prime. The crucial comparative
prime consisted of a capital letter and a lower-case letter (A-a).
In one experiment these primes were mixed with primes con-
sisting of two completely different letters (a-D, the low-similarity
context, Figure 2A), whereas in another experiment they were
mixed with primes consisting of exactly the same letters (a-a, the
high-similarity context, Figure 2B). In the low-similarity context
where a-A primes were relatively similar to a-a primes (com-
pared to a-D primes), a-A primes facilitated a “same” response
to the targets (Figure 2C). On the other hand, the same prime
(a-A) presented in the high-similarity context (containing a-a
FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Task-set-up. (C,D) Response times for the low-similarity and high-similarity context for the different prime types and prime-target congruency.
Adapted with permission from van Opstal et al. (2011a).
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primes) was relatively different and indeed facilitated a “differ-
ent” response to the targets (Figure 2D). Importantly, RTs were
equated across conditions and, therefore, could not (directly)
explain the observed effects. This may be an important step in
further pushing the boundaries of unconscious information pro-
cessing and opens the possibility that also a top-down task-set
may be enabled unconsciously (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
By now it is well established that subliminal information pro-
cessing (e.g., its depth, extent, and direction) is influenced by sev-
eral top-down cognitive functions, such as attention, task-set and
strategy. However, whether top-down context effects themselves
can be initiated or affected by subliminal stimuli is still under
scrutiny (see also Kunde et al., 2012). In this respect, the under-
lying mechanisms, boundary conditions and role of awareness
in blockwise congruency effects (Desender and van den Bussche,
2012) and context-specific proportion effects (Heinemann et al.,
2009) are interesting avenues for future experimentation. Next,
we will discuss another crucial and disputed aspect of subliminal
information processing: its alleged short-lived nature.
THE LIFE-TIME OF SUBLIMINAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
The amount of time that unconscious information can influence
cognitive processing is strongly debated. Typical masked priming
studies have reported a sharp decrease in the processing of masked
primes with the passage of time and it has been observed that
the influence of unconscious stimuli disappears within approx-
imately half a second (Greenwald et al., 1996; Mattler, 2005).
Although this initial evidence strongly pointed into the direc-
tion of a severely limited duration of unconscious processes (see
also Kunde, 2003), recent studies question this assumption and
have shown subtle influences of subliminal information across
relatively long periods of time.
A recent fMRI study showed strong and long-lasting effects of
unconscious task-relevant stimuli that were used for instrumental
conditioning (Pessiglione et al., 2008). Pessiglione and colleagues
performed a study in which subjects had to learn stimulus-value
associations for stimuli that were presented below the thresh-
old of awareness because of pattern masking. Some masked cues
were paired with monetary gains whereas others were coupled
with monetary losses. Subjects performed a task in which they
could opt for a safe choice that was never rewarded or pun-
ished, or they could opt for a risky choice that could be rewarded
(+£1), punished (−£1), or remain neutral. Behaviorally, subjects
chose the risky response more often following reward predic-
tive (masked) cues compared to punishment predictive (masked)
cues. Further, the effect was larger toward the end of the experi-
ment after many trials had been presented. The implicit learning
of cue-value associations was related to activation in the ventral
striatum. Arguably, one of the most surprising and interesting
aspects of these results was that the delay between the masked cue
and the eventual decision could be up to 3 s, suggesting a relatively
long duration of unconscious information processing (although
an RT analysis was not reported, precluding an analysis of which
prime processing durations were driving the behavioral effect).
Other long-term subliminal effects were recently reported in
various memory paradigms. Although consciousness and (work-
ing) memory seem intimately related (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Baars and Franklin, 2003), recent studies suggest that at
least some components of memory might also operate outside
of consciousness. In several experiments, Voss and colleagues
demonstrated another form of memory, namely recognition
memory, without explicit stimulus awareness (Voss et al., 2008;
Voss and Paller, 2009). They used colorful complex geometric
shapes (also referred to as “kaleidopscope images”) that were
shown in a learning phase and were tested in a recognition test
afterwards (the test-set is relatively large and the stimuli are
highly similar). When new and old items were presented simul-
taneously in the recognition phase, subjects often make correct
forced-choice decisions about these images without any explicit
recognition or subjective confidence; in fact, subjects typically
felt they were merely guessing (see also Jeneson et al., 2010).
Interestingly, subjects’ guess responses were more likely to be
accurate when the stimuli were initially presented during divided-
attention than during full-attention in the study phase, and when
subjects were encouraged to guess instead of encouraged respond-
ing confidently during the test phase. It seems that instructions
that encourage guessing can facilitate responses based on rapid
visual information processing, without competing (and distract-
ing) influences from explicit retrieval processes (Voss and Paller,
2010).
Recently Soto et al. (2011) went one step further and specifi-
cally tested the relation between working memory and awareness
(see alsoHassin et al., 2009). They briefly presented either a Gabor
cue (16.7ms) with a specific orientation, or a blank screen, fol-
lowed by a mask. After a retention interval (2–5 s) a test Gabor
stimulus was presented and subjects had to indicate whether
the orientation of the masked Gabor cue was tilted clockwise
or counter-clockwise with respect to the orientation of the tar-
get Gabor. Following this orientation response, subjects had to
indicate their subjective awareness of the masked Gabor cue on
a 4-point scale (ranging from 1 = “did not see anything,” to
4 = “saw the stimulus and its orientation”). For subjectively
invisible Gabor cues (all “1” responses) objective orientation
comparisons with the target were above chance level (generally
just above 55% in several experiments), even when a conscious
or unconscious distractor Gabor was presented in the reten-
tion interval. Based on this, the authors concluded that “visual
memory can encode, maintain and access unconscious items for
explicit discrimination goals” (p. 913). In this experimental setup,
the authors’ interpretation relies on the assumption that the sub-
jective awareness measure was sensitive enough to fully isolate
unaware Gabor cues from (partly) aware Gabor cues. At present,
this issue needs some further exploration (Overgaard et al., 2006;
Block, 2011), mainly because subjects generally used the lower
ends of the subjective awareness scale (55% of the trials fell in
category 1, 34% in category 2, 5% in category 3 and 6% in
category 4) and because objective Gabor detection performance
(compared to “nothing” trials) was above chance-level for all “1”
responses (d′ = 0.297). However, if confirmed, the demonstration
of unconscious working memory, resistant to distraction, may
have large implications for neurobiological and cognitive theories
of consciousness.
In all of the discussed studies so far the subliminal stimu-
lus affected (behavioral) responses directly, on the current trial.
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However, longer-lasting trial-by-trial modulatory effects of
subliminal stimuli are sometimes also reported, and the role
of awareness in both cognitive processes might differ con-
siderably (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Boy et al., 2010).
Typical trial-by-trial modulations are the slowing of responses
after errors (post-error slowing) and the reduction of conflict
interference after high-conflict compared to low-conflict tri-
als (conflict adaptation). These effects are generally thought
to originate from increased prefrontal top-down control trig-
gered by the error/conflict signal (Cohen et al., 2000; Botvinick
et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), although other interpre-
tations have also been proposed (Hommel et al., 2002; Mayr
et al., 2003; Notebaert et al., 2009; Schlaghecken and Martini,
2012). It is debated whether unconscious information can elicit
strategic, trial-by-trial and long-lasting (top-down) modulations
over subsequent stimulus processing (Desender and van den
Bussche, 2012). We will discuss the potential role of aware-
ness in conflict adaptation first (Greenwald et al., 1996; Kunde,
2003).
In a seminal study published in 1996, Greenwald and col-
leagues demonstrated that a subliminal prime-target pair (con-
sisting of valenced words, e.g., bomb-kiss) leaves no “memory
trace” that influences responding to the next prime-target pair
(Greenwald et al., 1996). Some years later, Kunde (2003) came to
the same conclusion. In his experiment, participants performed
a speeded two-choice response to a target arrow that was pre-
ceded by a smaller arrow (the prime). Because the prime fitted
within the contour of the target, the target functioned as a (meta-
contrast) mask and ensured that participants did not become
aware of it when it was presented briefly (14ms), but they did
when it was presented somewhat longer (126ms). Although in the
masked conditions, the prime could not consciously be perceived,
RTs were faster and subjects made fewer errors when the prime
and target were congruent than when they were incongruent (i.e.,
an unconscious correspondence effect). In contrast to these same-
trial effects, conflict adaptation (when the correspondence effect
on trial n is smaller when trials were preceded by an incongru-
ent trial compared to a congruent trial on trial n-1, Gratton et al.,
1992), was only the case when primes were presented consciously,
and not when primes were presented subliminally.
In recent years, others have replicated these results using a vari-
ety of paradigms; conflict adaptation effects are fully abolished
when the conflicting primes are strongly masked (Greenwald
et al., 1996; Kunde, 2003; Frings and Wentura, 2008; Boy et al.,
2010; Ansorge et al., 2011). However, in some recent studies con-
flict adaptation has been observed for masked prime stimuli,
although the effect is generally small (Bodner andMulji, 2010; van
Gaal et al., 2010a; Francken et al., 2011). Recently, we have sug-
gested that this discrepancy between studies might be due to the
timing and the attentional engagement of the subject in between
trials. At short trial intervals, the fleeting nature of the sublimi-
nal prime stimulus (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001) might cause
the effects to dissappear easily, either by overall distraction or
by the mere elapsing of time and strong attentional involvement
might slow down this process somewhat (note that primes are
always task-irrelevant in these tasks). In fact, this might also be
the case for conscious stimuli, but at a slower pace (Danielmeier
and Ullsperger, 2011; Egner et al., 2011). Recently, Desender and
van den Bussche (2012) reviewed a large set of studies regarding
the role of awareness in conflict adaptation and highlighted some
alternative interpretations of conflict adaptation effects that were
driven by subliminal stimuli. They reasoned that, although the
stimulus itself might be strongly masked and, therefore, sublim-
inal, the effect it has on behavior and cognition might become
conscious and drive conflict adaption. Subjects might for exam-
ple be able to monitor their RTs (Marti et al., 2011) and because
responses to incongruent trials are generally slower than to con-
gruent trials, subjects might become aware of the conflict or
difficulty by this means. Recently, it has been observed that our
“sense of control” is larger following congruent than incongru-
ent trials (or when action selection is “smooth and easy”) (Wenke
et al., 2010). In the case of unconscious conflict, wemight sense an
increased difficulty that calls for an increase of our sense of con-
trol over behavior, leading to trial-by-trial behavioral adaptations,
such as conflict adaptation and post-error slowing.
Neuroimaging has revealed that unnoticed errors do trigger
some aspects of error monitoring, such as ACC activity and
Error-related Negativity (ERN) ERP modulations, but not others,
such as insula activation and Error Positivity (Pe) ERP modu-
lations, although evidence is mixed (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001;
Hester et al., 2005; Overbeek et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2007;
O’Connell et al., 2007; Pavone et al., 2009; Ullsperger et al., 2010;
Woodman, 2010; Dhar et al., 2011). To examine the behavioral
consequences of aware and unaware errors, research has focused
mainly on post-error slowing: the behaviorally observed slow-
ing that occurs after the commission of an error (compared to
a correct response), potentially as a strategy to prevent future
errors. It has been observed that unnoticed (or unconscious)
errors sometimes elicit small post-error slowing effects (Cohen
et al., 2009) whereas sometimes they do not (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001; Endrass et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2007; van Gaal et al.,
2009). Recently, we have explored the trial-by-trial effects of
errors made to unconsciously presented stimuli (responses to
subliminal No-Go stimuli) (Cohen et al., 2009). To do so, we
separated responses on trials with a conscious No-Go circle
(termed “conscious errors”), responses on trials with an uncon-
scious No-Go circle (“unconscious errors”), and responses on
go trials (Figure 3A). Subjects slowed down their responses con-
siderably after conscious errors (∼20ms) and very subtly (but
significantly) after unconscious errors (∼3ms). Spectral granger
causality analyses revealed that conscious errors elicited top-down
modulations from frontal electrodes to occipital electrodes lead-
ing up to the next trial (in the inter-trial-interval) (see also King
et al., 2010 for error-related top-down modulations of motor and
sensory regions using fMRI). Crucially, these top-down modu-
lations were also observed after unconscious errors (Figure 3B),
thus suggesting that unconscious events can elicit an “automatic”
feedback loop in the absence of stimulus awareness. Importantly,
in this task, RTs on the previous trial on which the uncon-
scious error was made were equal, ruling out the possibility that
these longer-lasting trial-by-trial effects were due to the conscious
monitoring of RTs on the previous trials (Marti et al., 2011).
However, whether these effects can be explained by other meta-
cognitive processes such as experienced “effort” or “difficulty” is
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Task-set-up. (B) Response errors committed to trials
containing a conscious No-Go signal and unconscious No-Go signal elicit
long-lasting top-down influences from medial frontal (MFC) to occipital
(OCC) regions (electrodes) in a broad frequency band (∼1–12Hz), leading
up to the next trial. Effects for each of the three conditions separately
(upper panel) and the difference plots (lower panel) are shown. Time 0 is
the presentation of the Go-signal (black annulus). Plots are separated by the
significance of the event on the previous trial (correct Go response,
conscious error, or unconscious error). Adapted with permission from
Cohen et al. (2009).
an avenue for future research (Wenke et al., 2010; Desender and
van den Bussche, 2012). It is interesting to note that although
unaware errors seem to elicit relatively strong neural activity on
the current trial (mainly in the medial frontal cortex) which are
accompanied and followed by short-lived increases in top-down
interactions that might drive automatic behavioral adaptations
at relatively short inter-trial intervals (Cohen et al., 2009), long-
term behavioral adaptations on the next trial are generally weak.
Therefore, although speculative, error awareness might be bene-
ficial for broader longer-lasting control adaptations that might be
associated with activation in the anterior insula (Ullsperger et al.,
2010) and reflected in the (late part) of the Pe ERP component
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2007).
Overall, the discussed studies suggest that, under some specific
conditions, subliminal information might durably affect behav-
ior and brain activity, sometimes even beyond several seconds
(Gaillard et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2008; Capa et al., 2010;
Soto et al., 2011). Occasionally indirect consequences of sublim-
inal (affective) information can be measured for several minutes
(Gaillard et al., 2007) and up to even as long as 24 h after its pre-
sentation (Sweeny et al., 2009). Although some of these effects
may be caused by a form of learning and, therefore, synaptic
changes rather than long-lasting (and active) subliminal activa-
tion (Gaillard et al., 2007), other effects might be truly mediated
by the active maintenance of information across several seconds
of time. In the next section, we will focus on the role of stimu-
lus awareness in the integration of information across time and
space.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND DECISION-MAKING
The literature we reviewed so far shows that unconscious infor-
mation can affect high-level processes, and might even act on
aspects of cognitive control and (working) memory. Lastly, we
will discuss studies that investigated whether and how uncon-
scious information can be accumulated across time or space for
perception and decision-making. Active information integration
is considered one of the hallmarks of consciousness by many con-
temporary models of consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Engel and Singer, 2001; Crick and Koch, 2003; Baars, 2005; Seth
et al., 2008).
Several recent studies have observed that, under some condi-
tions, subliminal information can be accumulated and integrated
spatially across the visual field (van Opstal et al., 2011b). In one of
van Opstal’s experiments, subjects were presented with 4 spatially
separated numbers (primes) that were preceded and followed
by masks that prevented conscious perception of the primes. A
target, also consisting of four digits, followed the prime rapidly
and subjects had to indicate whether the mean of the 4 target
digits was more or less than 5. Interestingly, the mean of the
subliminal primes affected RTs and accuracy to target responses,
suggesting that so-called “ensemble statistics” might be extracted
unconsciously. Other recent evidence also suggests that multiple
unconscious stimuli can be integrated across space, for exam-
ple when visual scenes are presented in the absence of awareness
because of continuous flash suppression (Mudrik et al., 2011).
Also, expert chess players (but not novices) are able to extract
whether a subliminal (masked) simplified chess configuration
entails a checking configuration or not. However, this was only the
case for highly familiar chess configurations, and was not present
in a task that required the integration of local features, namely
field color (black or white) and chess piece (rook or knight).
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This suggests that experts have created chunks of common chess
configurations in long-term memory (which novices have not)
and, therefore, that they might not actively have to integrate indi-
vidual stimulus features (Kiesel et al., 2009). Generally, the extent
of practice might be crucial and partly explain why evidence in
the field is somewhat mixed. Others have shown that the inte-
gration of local features into global shapes does require stimulus
awareness, for example when stimuli are rendered invisible due to
counter-phase flickering of stimulus contrast (Schwarzkopf and
Rees, 2010).
Unconscious information also seems to be integrated or accu-
mulated across time, at least to some degree. Previous studies
have shown that subliminal information can be accumulated lin-
early over a few hundreds of milliseconds (Jaskowski et al., 2003;
Vorberg et al., 2003; Wentura and Frings, 2005; Del Cul et al.,
2007; Frings et al., 2008). For example, Jaskowski et al. (2003)
nicely showed that increasing the number of primes presented
before a target increases the behavioral priming effect. In their
task, subjects were required to respond to the spatial location of
a square with horizontal gaps presented together with a square
without such gaps. Targets could be preceded by either 1, 2, 3 or
4 primes (presented for 35ms each) which were smaller copies of
the target. Because the squares in every next stimulus were slightly
larger than the previous ones, they masked the preceding stimu-
lus. They showed that each of the 4 primes had an influence on
the response to target, and that with increasing number of primes
the priming effect was larger. Similarly, Vorberg et al. (2003) have
shown that when the time between prime and target is increased
(from 14 to 86ms in steps of 14ms) the behavioral priming effect
increases monotonically. Subjects had to respond to the direction
of a metacontrast target arrow that was preceded by a smaller ver-
sion of it. Importantly, because the stimuli were presented outside
the focus of attention (below and above fixation), there were no
SOA-related changes in prime awareness (see also Schmidt et al.,
2010). Together, these results suggest that subliminal information
can be accumulated over short periods of time (<150ms) and
increasingly impact behavior.
However, while the accumulation of information may be pos-
sible irrespective of the level of awareness over short periods of
time, recent studies have shown that awareness might play an
important role when the time across which information has to
be accumulated is increased. de Lange et al. (2011) performed
a task in which subjects had to accumulate multiple pieces of
evidence across 1.5 s. On each trial, subjects were presented a
stream of five arrows, each of which could point to the left
or right with equal probability. They had to quickly decide on
the direction of the majority of arrows, guessing if necessary
(Figure 4A). The strength of the evidence could range from one
(low evidence, e.g., two left and three right arrows) to five (high
evidence, e.g., five right arrows). The visibility of the arrows
was manipulated by masking them with an effective metacon-
trast mask leading to arrows near the threshold of awareness
(low visibility condition) or with an equiluminant but less effec-
tive “pseudo” mask (leading to high visibility). On each trial,
all arrows were either of low- or high visibility. Qualitative dif-
ferences in perception were confirmed by objective as well as
subjective discrimination measurements (leading to low vs. high
visibility arrows, instead of conscious vs. unconscious arrows).
Importantly, stimulus and mask duration were identical for both
conditions, which allowed the comparison of behavioral per-
formance of evidence accumulation (and the underlying neural
responses) without confounding stimulus visibility with basic
task parameters (e.g., signal strength) (Lau, 2008; Francken et al.,
2011). Behaviorally, subjects were able to accumulate evidence
FIGURE 4 | (A) Task-set-up. (B) Decision-making performance as a function
of accumulated evidence. Negative and positive numbers denote evidence
for a left- and right-hand response, respectively, (number of right-pointing
arrows minus number of left-pointing arrows). (C) Reaction times as a
function of accumulated evidence. (D) Influence of the last arrow on the final
decision as a function of the amount of previously accumulated evidence.
(E) Priming strength of single high visibility or low visibility arrow as
measured in a distinct masked priming task, in terms of response times.
HV, high visibility condition; LV, low visibility condition. Adapted with
permission from de Lange et al. (2011).
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over time for both visibility conditions (Figure 4B). However,
there were marked qualitative differences in how information was
accumulated for the different levels of awareness. First, decision-
making speed was modulated by the amount of accumulated
evidence, but only for high-visible stimuli (Figure 4C). Second,
once enough evidence had been gathered, participants strategi-
cally reduced the impact of new incoming stimuli (Figure 4D).
Crucially, by using the same stimulus parameters but now in a
masked priming task, it was observed that the amount of bottom-
up information provided by the arrows was the same for both
conditions, as reflected in an equal size of the behavioral priming
effect for both visibility conditions (Figure 4E). Thus, although
unconscious evidence may be accumulated in a linear fashion,
i.e., adding and subtracting new information without any regard
to the history of prior accumulated evidence, non-linearities in
evidence accumulation (for example, reducing the weight of new
information under conditions of high certainty, Kiani et al., 2008;
de Lange et al., 2010) may be present only for fully consciously
perceived information. This qualitative difference (linear vs. non-
linear integration) was also observed in concurrently measured
neural recordings: occipito-parietal regions that were involved
in the accumulation of the sensory evidence showed a “linear”
stereotypic response when presented with near-threshold infor-
mation, but modulated their activity strategically during the task
for clearly visible information. These results suggest that the
level of awareness of information changes decision-making: while
accumulation of evidence is already possible for low visibility
information, high visibility allows evidence to be accumulated up
to a much higher-level, leading to important changes in strategic
top-down decision-making.
Similarly, Sackur and Dehaene (2009) demonstrated a quali-
tative processing difference as a function of stimulus awareness
when studying sequential two-step arithmetic tasks with masked
and visible digits. In their task, participants were instructed to
add/subtract 2 from one masked or unmasked number (numbers
were part of a restricted set: 2, 4, 6, 8). Thereafter, subjects were
required to indicate whether the outcome of this first operation
was larger or smaller than 5. Interestingly, subjects were only able
to perform a “chained task” of addition followed by comparison
when the target digits were presented consciously, but not when
they were presented subliminally. However, they could perform
each individual computation above chance when the digits were
presented subliminally (see also Garcia-Orza et al., 2009; Ric and
Muller, in press). The authors have suggested that this qualitative
difference can be explained by assuming that subliminal digits do
not yield enough evidence to reach a threshold for the first com-
putational step of the chained task and that this did not allow
subjects to go past the first processing stage and deploy further
strategies.
Bijleveld et al. (2010) reported an interesting related observa-
tion. They presented subjects with a poorly or strongly masked
high- or low-reward cue (50 cents or 1 cent, respectively)
that was quickly followed by a simple mathematical operation
(e.g., 3 + 5 + 9 = 16). Subjects had to indicate whether the
expression was true or not. Two manipulations were crucial:
(1) only correct responses were rewarded, and (2) on each trial
the anticipated reward declined with time. They showed that
subliminal high-reward cues (compared to low-reward cues) sped
up the time people took to perform the mathematical opera-
tion, probably reflecting the increased investment of effort, but
did not change the overall accuracy of participants’ responses. In
contrast, conscious high-reward cues (compared to low-reward
cues) slowed down the time to perform the computation, but
crucially, with the benefit of increasing the overall accuracy of
the responses. In a second experiment, they showed that con-
scious and unconscious reward cues both elicit increases in effort
only (speeding of responses), when the possibility to change
the speed-accuracy balance is eliminated. Therefore, valuable
rewards seem to enhance the effort put in a task at hand irre-
spective of the awareness of the reward (see also Pessiglione et al.,
2007). However, the authors concluded that conscious rewards
might impact the balance between speed and accuracy (preferring
accuracy over speed), whereas unconscious reward cues do not,
thereby providing a qualitative difference between the pursuit of
rewards of which one is conscious vs. unconscious.
Although the sequential and spatial integration of multiple
elements was generally considered a hallmark of consciousness,
these recent results challenge that assumption and showed that
some parts of this integration process might also operate outside
of awareness. Further, it seems that, at least under some con-
ditions, awareness is beneficial for enabling strategic changes in
decision-making (see below for a more extensive discussion on
why this might be the case).
CONCLUSIONS, OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In this article, we have reviewed recent studies that have focused
on the complexity and strength of unconscious information pro-
cessing in relation to cognitive control (e.g., response inhibition,
conflict resolution, and task-switching), the life-time of informa-
tion maintenance (e.g., working memory, recognition memory)
and the possibility to integrate multiple pieces of information
across space and time. Unconscious information has been shown
to affect various perceptual and high-level cognitive functions
and the associated brain areas, including prefrontal cortex. In
some cases, unconscious information has been observed to affect
behavior and brain activity for relatively long periods of time.
Overall, these recent results highlight the power of unconscious
information processing, going beyond specific expectations for-
mulated in traditional theoretical models of consciousness and
the cognitive functions thought to require consciousness (for
reviews see Umilta, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Jack and
Shallice, 2001; Mayr, 2004; Hommel, 2007).
Based on this, one can conclude that the potential function
of consciousness might not be related to the initiation of cog-
nitive control functions by specific stimuli that signal the need
for increased control (e.g., stop-signals, task-switching cues).
These cognitive control operations are probably triggered by a
fast feedforward, and unconscious, early sweep of information
processing that reaches even regions in the prefrontal cortex
(van Gaal and Lamme, in press). This unconscious fast feedfor-
ward sweep can directly affect (the speed of) ongoing cognitive
processes. However, recent evidence also points out interesting
dissociations between conscious and unconscious information
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processing when it comes to the duration, the flexibility, and
the strategic use of information for complex operations and
decision-making (Sackur and Dehaene, 2009; de Lange et al.,
2011). Although recent evidence has clearly pushed the bound-
aries regarding the duration of unconscious effects, the general
observation is that unconscious events are much less able to elicit
(long-term) future behavioral adaptations than conscious events
(e.g., post-error slowing, conflict adaptation). Why might this
be the case? Theoretical models of consciousness suggest that
conscious awareness is related to long-lasting recurrent interac-
tions between (distant) brain regions (Lamme, 2006; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). This might enable the exchange of infor-
mation between several spatially separated cognitive modules,
which seems to break the automaticity of information process-
ing (Sackur and Dehaene, 2009). Awareness might be benefi-
cial for enabling flexible and durable information processing
strategies that are not directly triggered by a specific stimu-
lus, for example when information has to be integrated across
longer periods of time to bias information acquisition (de Lange
et al., 2011) or signal the need for performance adjustments
(Desender and van den Bussche, 2012). Recently, Kunde et al.
(2012) suggested that awareness might be dispensable when cog-
nitive control is signaled explicitly (by specific control-eliciting
stimuli) but not when it has to be inferred implicitly (by the
context, or history of events). This may prove to be a very use-
ful and plausible distinction and needs further experimentation
and exploration. Especially, the boundary conditions of implic-
itly signaled cognitive control are a promising avenue for future
research and might clarify why unconsciously signaled (implicit)
control operations are observed in some occasions but not in
others.
At present, we believe that two aspects of subliminal informa-
tion processing deserve more attention in future work, namely
the role of task-relevance of unconscious information and the
potential source of some of the subliminally triggered effects.
Typically, masked priming studies have used subliminal stimuli
that should be (actively) ignored for optimal task performance
(e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Kunde, 2003; Vorberg et al., 2003).
However, as discussed above, it seems that task-relevant uncon-
scious information has much stronger and longer-lasting effects
on behavior and brain activity than task-irrelevant information
(e.g., Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2008; van
Gaal et al., 2008; Soto et al., 2011), which might explain part of
the discrepancy in the overall findings in the field. More generally,
the significance of the unconscious events seems a crucial factor,
but at this point, future studies are needed to specifically test this
prediction.
Second, recent evidence suggests that some trial-by-trial effects
can be triggered by unconsciously presented stimuli, although
some of the effects are limited and are generally relatively small.
In some cases, these complex and relatively long-lasting effects
(e.g., congruency effects, trial-by-trial modulations) might be
explained by meta-cognitive effects, which need to be care-
fully controlled for to foster interpretation about the source
of the observed “unconscious” phenomena (Jaskowski et al.,
2003; Kinoshita et al., 2008; Wenke et al., 2010; see Desender
and van den Bussche, 2012 for an extensive review on this
issue). One of the main goals of future research could be to
test whether and to what extent these long-term effects are
caused by subjects becoming meta-cognitively aware of the con-
flict/error signals, although they are unaware of the initial source
of it.
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